Page:Ferrier's Works Volume 1 - Institutes of Metaphysic (1875 ed.).djvu/577

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LETTER TO MR DE QUINCEY.
549

ample, it is impossible for any mind to know that two straight lines enclose a space, or to know the opposite of any of the mathematical axioms; shall we say then that we are ignorant of these? That would be absurd. No man can be ignorant that two and two make five; for this is a thing not to be known on any terms, or by any mind. This fixes the law of ignorance, which is, that "we can be ignorant only of what can (possibly) be known," or, in barbarous locution, "the Knowable alone is the ignorable."

What, then, is the knowable alone, the only possibly knowable? Because if we can fix this we shall also fix the only ignorable, or that alone which we can be ignorant of. The Epistemology answers this question, and fixes thing-mecum, object plus subject, matter plus mind, as the only knowable. Along with whatever I apprehend (infinitely diversified though the things may be), I must apprehend me. And every intelligence must do the same: it must always apprehend itself along with the thing, whatever the thing may be. What I apprehend is never "things" but always "me-apprehending-things." (An objection must here be obviated: How do we come to overlook ourselves so completely as we usually do when apprehending things? Answer, The law of familiarity fully accounts for this.) Thing or things-plus-me is thus fixed as the only knowable, the only possibly knowable, and the knowable alone having been fixed as that which we