LETTER ON SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE
'INSTITUTES.'
1860.
The point at issue between Mr G. and me is this: He holds that the present self is never the object, or any part of the object, of our consciousness. I venture to hold the opposite opinion, and have given expression to it in my opening proposition, in which it is maintained that the self and the not-self are always apprehended simultaneously, although I admit that the self is usually no prominent or explicit portion of the cognition.
In Mr G.'s paper there is a certain ambiguity (as I daresay there are plenty on my side of the question), something at least about which I am in doubt, and which must be cleared up before any progress can be made in the discussion; in fact, before there can be either any disagreement or any agreement between us. I shall endeavour, at the outset, to explain what this ambiguity or inconsistency is.
In every case of cognition more is implied than is expressly known. For instance, when I look at a
