the operation. To discover these I must have recourse to renewed observation and anatomy.
But what I am at a loss about is the answer which Mr G. gives to this important question. This is the article in regard to which I venture to think that he is ambiguous. From the general purport of the remarks in which he controverts my position, I would conclude that he is opposed to the doctrine of "implicit cognitions." But there are expressions in his note which seem to point to the opposite conclusion. He says that the ego "is understood in all propositions," understood, of course, by itself and to itself; that is to say, known implicitly and in the present time. And in his last sentence he says," In practice men lose sight of it (the ego) because of its universality; but these forgotten but distinct elements are the very matters which the analysing philosopher should take the most pains to bring clearly into view." On this I would remark that it is not possible for the analysing philosopher to bring clearly into view any element of consciousness which was not known obscurely beforehand. Reflection is his only instrument; and reflection cannot originate knowledge: it can only make us know clearly and explicitly what we already know confusedly and implicitly.
The result is, that I am in doubt as to the ground occupied by Mr G. in reference to implicit cognitions. Does ha deny them altogether? Must all cognition be either express or null? In that case, he will find it very difficult, or rather impossible, to
