sion of that conception, so derived, would be fatal to the Berkeleian theory. Therefore its author wisely avoids the danger by holding that in vision we have merely the perception of what the Germans would call the Auseinanderseyn, that is, the asunderness, of things—a perception which implies no judgment as to whether the things are secerned in plane or in protensive space.
With regard to the supposition that, in order to preserve Berkeley's consistency, it was necessary for him to teach that our visual sensations (colours namely), being internal feelings, could involve the perception neither of plane nor of solid extension—that is to say, of no extension at all, according to Mr Bailey's ideas—we shall merely remark that there appears to us to be no inconsistency in holding, as Berkeley does, that these colours, though originally internal to the sight, are nevertheless perceived as extended among themselves.
We shall now say a few words on the relevancy of the question, for Mr Bailey denies that this question concerning the reciprocal outness of visible objects ought to form any element in the controversy. We shall show, however, that one of his most important arguments depends entirely on the view that may be taken of this question; and that while the argument alluded to would be utterly fatal to Berkeley's theory, if the perception of reciprocal outness were denied, it is perfectly harmless if the perception in question be admitted.
