matter," replies the inquirer, "is, that human consciousness is a fact known from experience."
"Exactly so," rejoins the other; "and now we have reached the point of the question, and I wish you to observe particularly the effect which this fact has upon 'the human mind,' and the 'science of the human mind.' The results of our arguments shall be summed up and concluded in a few words."
"Matter is not 'I.' I know it only by its changes. It is an object to me, objicitur mihi. This is intelligible enough, or is at least known from experience, and a science of it is perfectly practicable, because it is really an object to me. Suppose, then, that 'mind' also is not I, but that I have some mode of becoming acquainted with its phenomena or changes just as I have of becoming acquainted with those of matter. This, too, is perfectly conceivable. Here, also, I have an object. Aliquod objicitur mihi: and of this I can frame a science upon intelligible grounds. But I can attribute no consciousness to this object. The consciousness is in myself. But suppose I vest myself in this object I thus identify myself with mind, and realise consciousness as a fact of mind, but in the meantime what becomes of mind as an object?[1] It has vanished in the process. An object can be conceived only as that which may possibly become an object to something else. Now what can mind become
- ↑ Of course it is not merely meant that mind is not an object of sense. Far more than this: it is altogether inconceivable as an object of thought.
