and therefore they cannot themselves be received into the mind; for in order to receive themselves they must be already there to render their own reception possible. The inevitable and irresistible inference is, that they are already there, or, if not these ideas, that at any rate something innate and a priori is already in the mind, and that the mind has within it cognitions or elements of cognition which are not imparted to it from any foreign quarter. Such, stated very briefly, is the ground on which the psychology of innate ideas rests, the reasoning by which it is supported.
7. That there is much truth in this doctrine of innate ideas, when rightly understood and expounded, I firmly believe. I cannot pause at present to attempt its complete explanation and adjustment. The following hint must suffice. In speaking of innate ideas, I have called them indifferently "cognitions" or "elements of cognition." But in attempting to establish a right doctrine on this subject, these two expressions, "cognitions" and "elements of cognition," would require to be most signally and accurately distinguished. If the innate ideas be represented as mere elements of cognition, a perfectly correct and intelligible and impregnable psychology of innate ideas may, I conceive, be set on foot. But if the innate ideas be regarded as cognition, that is, as completed cognitions, nothing but an untrue doctrine, a doctrine of the most unintelligible and most bewildering character, can emerge. I may add that it
