could not disbelieve the existence of the objects of sense, because, never having had any of the less substantial objects of the imagination before him, having no conception of these, he could not be betrayed into the scepticism of thinking that the object before hint might possibly be no more real than they, and hence, not being able to disbelieve the existence of the objects of sense, indeed not being able to form any conception of disbelief, he would necessarily believe in their existence.
Again, the man of imagination could not disbelieve the existence of the objects of his one faculty, because, never having had any of the more substantial objects of sense before him, never having contrasted or compared the objects of imagination with, those of sense, he could not be betrayed into the scepticism of thinking that the objects of the imagination were unreal and precarious, while those of sense were real and permanent; and hence, not being able to disbelieve the existence of the objects of the imagination, not being able any more than the other man to form any conception of disbelief, he would necessarily believe in the existence of the objects of the imagination, just as his neighbour believed in the existence of the objects of perception.
6. Now, the same thing which we have supposed to take place in two separate minds, may take place in one mind. We supposed one mind endowed with perception alone, and another mind endowed with
