are not the essence of the universe, not the ultimately and absolutely real, because they are not the truth for all, but only the truth for some intelligence, that is, for intelligence constituted with senses like ours.
8. To clear up this philosophy still further, it is right that I should state to you the grounds on which I hold that number is an object of reason, that is, of the universal faculty in man; in other words, is an object of all reason, and is not an object of sense, or of the particular faculty in man; in other words, is not an object merely of some intelligence. My reason, then, for holding that number is an object of pure thought rather than of sense is this; that every sense has its own special object, and is not affected by the objects of the other senses. For instance, sight has colour for its object, and can take no cognisance of sound. In the same way hearing apprehends sound, and takes no cognisance of colour. In like manner we cannot touch colours or sounds, but only solids. Neither can any man taste with his eyes, or smell with his ears. If number, then, were an object of sense, it would be the special object of some one sense; but it is not this. It accompanies our apprehension of all the objects of the senses, and is not appropriated to any sensible objects in particular. It is not like all the other objects of sense, the special object of any one sense, and therefore I conclude that it is not an object of sense at all, but an
