we can form of change, the only correct explanation of it which can be given. And such, also, I believe to be the way in which nature works.
25. But let us try the other alternative; let us suppose that change takes place per saltum, or with intervals between each state. This, indeed, is the only way in which we can suppose it to take place, if we hold asunder Being and not-Being, regarding them as separate conceptions, and not as the inseparable elements of one conception. Let us suppose, then, that the thing is in a fixed and definite state of being; and that its changes take place per saltum; that is to say, that the thing is first in the state A, in the state called the appearance of A; that secondly it is in the state in which A disappears—in the state, that is, of A's disappearance; that thirdly it is in the state we call B; fourthly in the state we call B's disappearance; fifthly in the state we call C; sixthly in the state we call C's disappearance, and so on. Now, here it is obvious that just as the appearance or being of A is not the disappearance or not-being of A, so neither is the disappearance or not-being of A the appearance or being of C. What then happens? This happens, that there is an interval between the appearance or being of A, and the appearance or being of B, in which interval the thing is in no state at all. This is the interval between A's disappearance and B's appearance. A's being is not A's not-being, because on this supposition Being and not-
