Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/192

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HERACLITUS.
137

doctrine of Heraclitus, I may remark that the distinction between the universal faculty and the particular faculty in man, is expressed more distinctly in his fragments than in those of any of the philosophers who preceded him. The universal faculty he calls κοινὸς; or ξυνὸς λόγος, the particular he calls ἰδία φρόνησις. The κοινὸς λόγος is evidently the quality or power common to all intelligence, the principle in which they all agree. The ἰδία φρόνησις is evidently the quality or power peculiar to different kinds of intelligence. The one principle, the κοινὸς λόγος, lays hold of absolute truth as it is for all; the other principle, the ἰδία φρόνησις, lays hold of relative truth, truth as it exists for some, that is, for man considered as a peculiar intelligence. It is through the κοινὸς λόγος that we apprehend Becoming as made up of Being and not-Being. The understanding and senses could never make known to us this truth, they lead us away from its recognition. In virtue of sense and understanding, the ἰδία φρόνησις, we regard the universe as a stationary existence, subject, no doubt, to changes; in virtue of reason, the κοινὸς λόγος, we regard it as a continual alternation of Being and not. Being, and we see that the latter no less than the former is essential to the ongoings and constitution of nature, considered as a constantly varying and never resting process.

30. Before offering a summary of the system of Heraclitus, I may say just one word on the scope of