Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/195

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140
GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

the Eleatics, does not deny altogether the truth of their principle. He does not deny that Being is a necessary truth, a truth for all intellect. He rather admits this. But he holds at the same time that it is only a half thought, and not a whole thought. It is a half conception, which requires to be supplemented by its other half, the factor, namely, called not-Being. The unity of these constitutes the true and total conception; and that true and total conception is expressed by the term Becoming.

33. In the third place, to decide between these conflicting parties, Heraclitus on the one hand, and the Eleatics on the other; to determine the merits of their respective principles, and to get some insight into their systems, we must observe how these principles work, and how far they are explanatory of the changing phenomena of the universe. The Eleatic principle will not work at all. This system comes instantly to a dead-lock; or rather it cannot get under way, for it is impossible to explain change, if we hold asunder Being and not-Being, and regard them as two separate conceptions. The more we reflect on it the more are we convinced of this impossibility. Consider; a thing is in a particular state, which state is its being. Call this state A. I wish it to change; I wish to get it into some other state, call it B. But to get it into the state B, I must get it out of the state A; to put on B it must put off A. I shall suppose, then, that I get it out of the state A,