hand, matter with its qualitative differences consists of Being and some other element, that other element can be nothing else than not-Being, for not-Being alone can be placed in opposition to Being in the ultimate analysis of thought. Place anything else in opposition to it, and you will find that you are opposing Being to Being; in other words, are laying down no antithesis at all.
8. But without dwelling on the unsatisfactory logic of Empedocles, we may sum up the substance of this system under these two heads. First, he accepts the Eleatic principle of Being; and, secondly, by modifying this principle, in other words, by postulating different kinds of Being, or of matter endowed with inherent qualitative diversities, he endeavours to obviate the consequences of the Eleatic position, we think, with very indifferent success. But the two points now referred to are those which you ought to keep in mind in connection with the philosophy of Empedocles; because their consideration throws light on the origin of the Atomic philosophy, of which I am about to speak. Empedocles, as I said, clung to the Eleatic principle of Being, and endeavoured to account for changes by means of certain qualitative differences which he supposed to be originally inherent in Being. The Atomists cling to the same principle, but, discarding all qualitative differences, they conceived that change was explicable on the ground of mere quantitative differences in matter.
