of provisions thus becomes a new intermediate end; and this we shall say is the proximate end, the end which he must aim at and overtake in the first instance, before he can expect to accomplish any of the other ends. From this simple case, thus roughly drawn out, you may perceive what a succession of ends may have to be gone through before the ultimate end is overtaken, and how each means becomes in its turn an end, until the whole series is gone through. You may also, from this illustration, understand the difference between final cause, efficient cause, and natural cause. In this case the final cause of the house was the good or comfort of the savage; the efficient cause was the active power of the savage, which enabled him, we shall suppose, to carry through all the operations required before the house could be constructed; and the material cause was the provisions, the mechanical knowledge, the assistance received, together with the stones, wood, and lime of which the house was built. From this plain (although very rough and hasty) illustration, you may understand—and this is the point I wish you to bear in mind—how, in considering the subject of ends, thought Is necessarily regarded as preceding execution; how intelligence and foresight necessarily go before realisation. Suppose that the savage had set about hoarding up provisions blindly, and without any purpose in view; suppose that he had studied mechanics, and got his neighbours to assist him in fabricating tools and machines blindly and without any purpose in view; suppose that he had set himself and them to
