Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/316

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SOCRATES.
261

is knowledge, and all vice ignorance. This apparently paradoxical assertion may perhaps be interpreted in this way: If a man only knew and kept constantly in view what his true nature was, he would aim only at that which conduced to the wellbeing of that nature; and aiming only at this, he would be unwavering in the practice of virtue, for it is by virtue alone that the wellbeing of his true nature is secured. For example, if a man knew and never lost sight of the knowledge that thought is his true nature, that freedom is the essence of thought, that thought is the antagonist of sensation, passion, and desire, that it is by thought that man is disengaged from these, the enslaving forces of his being, and established in this true personality ;—if a man knew, and kept constantly in view, that such was his true nature, he would aim at the preservation and well-being of that nature by laying a suitable restraint on those lower impulses and propensities which at all times threaten to invade and impair it, and thus he would continue steadfast in the pursuit and practice of virtue; for virtue is nothing but a restraint laid upon the natural lusts and passions of the soul. Hence, if man's knowledge of himself was perfect, his virtue too would be perfect; and in proportion as his knowledge approaches to perfection, so too would his virtue approach to perfection. But man's knowledge of himself is, for the most part, not only imperfect, it is absolutely null. His ignorance of his true nature is such, that he mistakes for his