to be a man; he does not become an animal. Man, then, considered as man simply, is man endowed with thought, reason, self-consciousness. These cannot be disunited, for these are his very essence. Such is the character and constitution of man, considered as man simply. Secondly, of man considered as susceptible of pleasure and of pain. This point requires no explanation. Pleasure and pain, I may merely say, are not essential to man, as thought and intelligence and self-consciousness are. Man can be man without them. You can readily understand that happiness and misery are something which are superinduced upon man; at least, are not so intimately his as those other qualities which have been specified—viz., thought, reason, and self-consciousness.
21. We have now to ask, What kind of moral scheme will be applicable to man, considered simply as man? The answer is, that the scheme of morals which will suit him will be such as the anti-Utilitarians contend for. Happiness cannot be his summum bonum, nor can misery be his summum malum, for, considered as man simply, he has no sense either of happiness or of misery. Something else, therefore, must be his chief good and his chief evil; something different from happiness must be what he pursues; something different from misery must be what he shuns. What must these be? They can be no other than the maintenance or the perfection of his being
