that it is impossible for us to think only of that of which we have had experience. This is merely another form of the assertion just made, that all thinking is necessarily a passing from the singular to the universal. I shall endeavour, by means of a very simple illustration, to explicate what this proposition involves. I wish to show you more particularly what is meant by the universality of ideas. A man sees an object for the first time, let us say a chair. Now so long as he merely sees it, his state is purely sensational, he is limited to the particular, he is shut up in the region of the singular. Let us now suppose that he thinks it. What is the exact nature of the mental operation here performed? I conceive it to be this: In thinking the chair, the man views it as an instance of which there may be, or axe, other instances. Suppose that the man had never seen anything except this chair, in thinking it, he would still think it as something; that is (even although he had no language to express his thoughts), he would nevertheless place it under the category of thing; in other words, he would think other possible chairs (and other possible things) as well. If he thinks the chair, I affirm that he cannot think merely it, but must think something more. Here then is a marvellous consideration: The man has had experience only of one chair, of one thing; but in thinking it, he has thought other chairs, other things; in short, he has thought something of which he has had no experience. This is an astonishing
