incomplete. I may say a few words on each of them.
4. In regard to the first of these, matter or ὕλη, Aristotle's doctrine is this: Matter is not, properly speaking, the existent; neither is it the absolutely non-existent: it is mere potentiality (δύναμις), a capability of passing into the actual. When form, οὐσία εἶδος, supervenes to matter or ὕλη, the potential is converted into the actual, and the result is completed existence. This perfected existence, at least when organised, is called by Aristotle ἐντελέχεια, and also ἐνέργεια. Thus, δύναμις and ὕλη are nearly synonymous in the Aristotelic philosophy. They denote a mere capacity of existence; ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια are also nearly synonymous, and denote the actuality of existence, existence realised. These words play an important part in the system of Aristotle, metaphysical, physical, and moral. There is another important word which I may mention here, στέρησις, privation. Matter devoid of all form would be in a state of στέρησις or privation. Thus, στέρησις is the opposite of ἐντελέχεια, for this latter term expresses the union of matter and form (ὕλη and οὐσία). It is not to be supposed that matter is ever in a state of absolute privation. Such a state is a mere mental abstraction, or rather it is a nonsensical, inconceivable condition.
5. The second principle which Aristotle lays down
