bodily; it centres in reason, and not in sense; secondly, it implies excellence, that is, virtue; thirdly, it is an activity, or energy, and not a mere potentiality of our nature; and fourthly, it implies a life favourably situated in regard to its external lot. All these conditions must combine in order to render human happiness complete; and Aristotle holds that his definition is the only one which embraces within it the whole of them.
21. It has been said, in the terms of our definition, that man's proper office is to live rationally, and that his happiness consists in living rationally in the best or most excellent way. Hence the new question arises, What is the best or most excellent way of living rationally? To answer this question, we must again inquire into the constitution of human nature. This constitution is made up mainly of two parts. First, the principle of reason; and secondly, the principle of desire. Stated shortly, reason and passion are the two principal constituents of man's ψυχή, or immaterial part. In regard to reason, it has an excellence of its own in which the intellectual virtues consist. (These we leave out of view at present.) The matter which requires our consideration is the relation between reason and the passions. It is the office of reason to control the passions. The passions are able to obey, but they have also a tendency to resist the influence of reason. The passions, we may say, quicken and arouse the reason; the reason
