consideration. Near the commencement of book second he says—[1]
"Not one of the moral virtues comes to be in us merely by nature; because, of such things as exist by nature, none can be changed by custom; a stone, for instance, by nature gravitating downwards, could never by custom be brought to ascend, not even if one were to try and accustom it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor could fire again be brought to descend, nor in fact could anything whose nature is in one way be brought by custom to be in another. The virtues, then, come to be in us neither by nature nor against nature; but we are naturally disposed to receive them, and are perfected in them by habit.
"Again, all the things that come to us by nature we possess first as faculties (δυνάμεις); afterwards we exhibit them in actual operation (τἀς ἐνέργειας). This is clear with regard to the senses, for we did not get our senses by hearing often and seeing often, but, on the contrary, we had them and then used them; we did not have them by using them. But the virtues we gain by having acted first, as is the case with the arts also, for those things which one must learn before one can do, one learns by doing; as, for instance, by building, builders are formed, and by harping, harpers. So too, by doing just things we become just; by doing temperate things, temperate; by doing brave things, brave.
- ↑ The translation is partly taken from Mr Chase, partly from Sir A. Grant.
