fore it is proper that the acts should be of a right quality, in order that the habits which they generate may be of a right quality too. And it makes no small, but a great, yea, the greatest of differences, whether we are accustomed to act in this or in that particular way, even from our earliest childhood."
26. I go on to offer a few words of comment on the quotation from Aristotle's Ethics brought before you in the preceding section. His doctrine in regard to our having no natural capacity, δύναμις, or virtue may require some slight explanation, in order to prevent it from being misconceived. There are, according to Aristotle, two kinds of δύναμις, a δύναμις properly so called, and a δύναμις less properly so called. The δύναμις properly so called is a natural power, always followed by a constant and uniform species of ἐνέργεια; the δύναμις less properly so called, may issue in two opposite species of ἐνέργεια. The former may be called a δύναμις restricted to one issue; the latter may be called a δύναμις capable of two opposite issues; it is in fact called so by Aristotle, δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων. To illustrate these two, taking Aristotle's as well as other examples, a stone has a δύναμις of falling downwards to the earth; it is limited to that one issue; it has no δύναμις of falling upwards. When the δύναμις passes into act or ἐνέργεια, the stone takes a downward course, δύναμις proper. A grain of wheat has a δύναμις of passing into the green blade and then into the full ear. It has no
