does not arise out of the capacity. When the capacity has been created by the practice, we may then say that we have a capacity or power of virtue, δύναμις τῆς ἀρητῆς; but Aristotle calls this power, not δύναμις, but ἕξις, or habit, which, however, is nothing but an acquired δύναμις.
31. These explanations having been given, we shall have no great difficulty in removing a certain objection which may be taken to this doctrine, of the origin of virtue. Aristotle has himself taken notice of the objection I refer to; it is this:—The objector says that some sort of paradox, or at least confusion, is involved in the doctrine that virtue is a habit. We are told, says he, that virtue is properly a habit, and then we are told that, in order to acquire this habit, we must first of all practise virtue. But how can we practise virtue, if, in order to practise it, we must have already practised it? How can we get a beginning? Or, if we can practise virtue before we have acquired the habit of virtue, how can it be said that virtue is properly a habit? For example, how can it be said that we become just, by doing just things? If we can do just things, in order to acquire the virtue of justice, we are surely just already, and antecedent to the practice of justice. Aristotle's solution of this difficulty or confusion seems to be as follows:—
32. "Virtue follows the analogy of the arts, in
