to be called virtuous acts as the first harsh essays on the fiddle by a musical tyro are entitled to be called tunes; or as the first pair of leathern encumbrances fabricated by an apprentice to St Crispin are deserving of the appellation of shoes. "The first acts by which we acquire justice, are, according to Aristotle, not really and properly just: they want the moral qualification of that settled internal character in the heart and mind of the agent without which no external act is virtuous in the highest sense of the term." They are helps and tendencies towards the acquirement of this character, as the first essays of the artist are towards the acquirement of an art. But they are not to be confounded with those moral acts which flow from the character when developed and fixed.
34. Aristotle's doctrine in regard to virtue being a habit (in Greek ἕξις) will be better understood if we consider it in relation to what he calls δύναμις, that is, power or capacity, and to what he calls ἐνέργεια, that is, energy or actuality. All men are born with certain natural powers or capacities (δυνάμεις); they have a δύναμις or capacity of growth, of feeling pleasure and pain, of seeing, hearing, and of using their other senses. When from this capacity to grow growth actually ensues, the δύναμις passes into ἐνέργεια or actuality. When man's capacity to feel pleasure and pain, his capacity to see, hear, and so forth, become the actual feeling of pleasure or pain, become
