arising out of the capacity or δύναμις of virtue, it is rather the δύναμις which arises out of the ἐνέργεια or practice. To acquire the power or capacity or disposition of virtue, we must first of all be virtuous. The practice of virtue reacts so powerfully on the capacity of virtue, that it may be said almost to create that capacity. In this respect, then, the δύναμις and ἐνέργεια of virtue are very different from the natural δυνάμεις and ἐνέργειαι before spoken of. In the latter cases the actuality proceeds out of the capacity; in the former the capacity is first formed by means of the actuality. Now a δύναμις, or power or capacity, acquired by practice, is called by Aristotle ἕξις, a habit or permanent condition; and this is what he says the true character of virtue is: it is not δύναμις, or natural power issuing anew in certain natural actions, but it is ἕξις, a moral habit acquired by the practice of certain actions, and issuing anew in the performance of actions which possess a higher moral significance on account of the habit out of which they flow.
36. Perhaps you will here ask, Has, then, man, according to Aristotle, no natural capacity of virtue? and if he has not, how does he ever put forth those acts by means of which he is said to acquire the habit, or disposition, or capacity of virtue? The answer seems to be, that man has no original capacity of virtue, but he has an original capacity of acquiring that capacity. Man has no original capacity of
