natural power is not itself that capacity; or at any rate it is not this until it has been so reacted upon by the practice of virtue as to have become a confirmed habit, or ἕξις, of the mind. The main points then, comprehended under Aristotle's assertion that virtue is a habit may be summed up as follows:—
38. There is, first, an unconfirmed or indefinite power of acting either rightly or wrongly. This may be called a δύναμις in the sense already explained; but δύναμις more properly applies to powers which are limited by nature to one issue, which the power in question is not: it is open indifferently either to virtue or vice. Then, secondly, there is προαίρεσις, a power of choice, involving freedom, reflection, deliberation, and will. This power may for a time be guided by instructors. But its proper function is that of self-determination: a man is self-determined to be either virtuous or vicious. Then, thirdly, there is ἐνέργεια. This is the act, or rather the continually-repeated act, the practice or custom through which, fourthly, the ἕξις or habit of virtue (or vice) is formed. This practice is the most important element in the process: through it the ἕξις, or habit, or disposition, is built up. It is the sap which feeds and supports the life of our moral nature. ̒Έξισ includes an insight or recognition of the worth and excellence of this habit, and of the actions by which it has been formed. There is, fifthly, the conduct which flows out of this ἕξις, conduct to which alone the
