Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/472

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ARISTOTLE.
417

54. In going over the main points of Aristotle's ethics, I have shown you what, according to him, the ultimate end of human action is, and what the means of its attainment are. We have seen, to state the matter in very simple language, that human happiness, or man's ultimate end, consists in living reasonably in the best way possible, and that the best way of living reasonably, is by subjugating our passions to reason. We have seen that this subjugation is effected through custom, and that the custom here practised is that which aims at the mean between two extremes. We have also seen what the test is by which a man may know whether he is truly virtuous or not. A man, according to Aristotle, may perform virtuous actions without being himself virtuous, because he may perform these occasionally, or by fits and starts, without possessing that fixed habit which alone constitutes virtue, in which case he is not properly regarded as a virtuous character.

55. I shall conclude this exposition with a few remarks quoted from Book x. of Aristotle's Ethics, in which he shows that happiness is to be found rather in a life of contemplation, than in a life of practical activity.[1] He says—"Now if happiness be a working in the way of excellence, of course that excellence must be the highest, that is to say, must be the excellence of the best principle of our nature. Whether, then, this best principle is intellect, or some other

  1. C. 7 and 8. Cited mainly from Chase's translation, p. 362 and foll.