Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/474

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ARISTOTLE.
419

for its own sake, and, therefore, is alone an end in itself. Again, this life of contemplation seems to constitute each man's proper self, and being so, it would be absurd for a man not to choose his own life.

"Further, that the most perfect happiness must be a kind of contemplative activity (θεωρία), may appear also from the following consideration: our conception of the gods is, that they are, above all, blessed and happy. Now, what kind of moral actions are we to attribute to them? Those of justice? Nay, will they not be set in a ridiculous light, if represented as forming contrasts, and restoring deposits, and so on? Well, then, shall we picture them performing brave actions, withstanding objects of fear, and meeting dangers because it is noble to do so? or liberal ones? but to whom shall they be giving? In short, if one followed this subject into all details, the circumstances connected with moral actions will appear trivial and unworthy of the gods.

"Still every one believes that they live, and therefore that they work, because it is not supposed that they sleep their time away like Endymion: now, if from a living being you take away action, still more if creation, what remains but contemplation? So then the working of the gods, eminent in blessedness, will be one apt for contemplative speculation: and of all human workings, that will have the greatest capacity for happiness which is nearest akin to this."