Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/519

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GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

pendent truth under which we labour, in consequence of the relative character of all our sensible, intellectual, and moral impressions. It was rather to magnify the power and supremacy of man that the Sophists, or some of them at least, represented him as the measure of the universe; it was rather to convict him of an ignorance altogether irremediable, and to prove that he was utterly incompetent to attain to any degree of objective certainty and truth, that the Sceptics represented him in the same light.

10. Stated plainly, the question which Pyrrho, or we may say the Sceptic generally, raises is this: Are our faculties competent to give us any certain information as to what anything is in itself, and out of its relation to us? And the answer is, that our faculties are not competent. They can only declare what a thing is in relation to themselves. And further, our faculties do so alter and modify things in conformity with their own structure, that it is impossible for us to know them as they are in themselves. Hence real and objective truth is placed altogether beyond our reach. We can be certain of the phenomenon, we can be certain that the appearance is as it appears, but we can have no certainty as to the νοούμενον or transcendental something which lies at the back of the phenomenon. We cannot know what this is in itself. For instance, when I look at a laurel leaf, I am certain that I see what I see,—viz., a smooth and shining surface. No Sceptic ever doubted that. I