what I conceive to be the essential preliminaries to the study of the history of philosophy.
6. The essential preliminary to the study of the history of philosophy is, a clear conception of philosophy itself. Without this the history of philosophical systems cannot be studied to much—or, I would rather say, to any—advantage. It may be thought that philosophy itself is best learned from the study of its history: and there can be no doubt that the latter reacts upon the former in the way of rendering our conception of philosophy more definite, as well as more comprehensive. The conception of philosophy is confirmed and enlightened by the survey of philosophical systems. But without some tolerably definite conception of what philosophy is, and of what it aims at, the study of these systems is a vain and unprofitable pursuit. We must have this conception to begin with—we must have it to found upon—otherwise we cannot expect to derive any intellectual improvement from the study of the history of philosophy; we shall be baffled and bewildered at every turn by the apparent extravagances and unintelligibilities which we encounter. Even when we carry with us a clear conception of philosophy, we are frequently perplexed when tracing historically the mazy windings of speculation; but without this clue we should be utterly lost and confounded.
7. What, then, is the conception of philosophy?
