Page:Ferrier Works vol 2 1888 LECTURES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY.pdf/71

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GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

apprehends in conformity with its common capacity is absolute truth. It is further obvious from this explanation that relative truth is, as I have already frequently said, truth merely for some minds; while absolute truth is truth for all intelligence: and this analysis of the mind into a common capacity and a peculiar capacity, furnishes us, we shall by-and-by see, the true ground of the well-known distinction of the human faculties into sense, understanding, and reason.

18. To return to our definition of philosophy: Without altering the meaning of that definition, I may slightly vary its expression; for ideas sometimes gain in distinctness by being presented under different forms of expression. Truth, we may say, is that which is—it is the real; so that, instead of saying that philosophy is the pursuit of absolute truth, that is, of truth as it exists for all intelligence, we may say that "philosophy is the pursuit of the absolutely real, that is, of the real as it exists for all intelligence." These two expressions are synonymous; but, perhaps, to some of you the latter form of the definition may be the more significant of the two.

19. This definition may be open to objections; but I cannot think that it is open to any well-founded objections. As objections, however, are actually urged, which are very pertinacious, if not very strong, some notice must be taken of them. They are so obtrusive, and they have carried with