itself to the universal part of his own intelligent nature; this universal part being the same in all, the truth which it apprehends must be the same for all; in other words, that which it apprehends must be the truth for all intelligence, and not merely the truth for man's intelligence; it must be absolute and not mere relative truth. On the other hand, if it be true that there is no common nature, no universal faculty in all intelligence, no point in which all minds agree; in that case it must be admitted that the objection is fatal to our definition of philosophy. In that case man can have no dealings with absolute and universal truth; the only truth of which he can be cognisant must be relative and particular. But observe the contradiction in which we get involved if we take up this position. I have already stated what this contradiction is, and therefore I merely repeat my statement, that if we deny to intelligences a common nature in which they all participate, or if we deny to man's intelligence a participation in this common nature, we fall into the absurdity of at once including certain things under the same category of thought, and of excluding at the same time some of these things from that category.
21. My object at present is rather to furnish insight than to inspire conviction. I wish you rather to understand what I say, than to be convinced by what I say; and I think you may now understand distinctly the positions respectively occupied by the
