truths, man has a corresponding particular faculty; and in reference to the universal truths, that he has a corresponding universal faculty.
27. This analysis I regard as the most fundamental distinction which can be drawn in the science of the mind. It lies at the root of the ordinary division of the mind into Sense, Understanding, and Reason. If you were asked in what do these three differ, you would find it difficult to return a perfectly satisfactory answer. In regard more particularly to understanding and reason, you would find yourselves at a loss; for the difference between these two is what no psychology has as yet succeeded in explaining. But say that reason is the universal faculty, the faculty of truth as it exists for all intelligence, and that sense and understanding are divisions of the particular faculty, that is, of the faculty of truth as it exists for some, but not for all intelligence, and light breaks in upon the distinction. You perceive that the faculty which is conversant with truth for all must be different from the faculty which deals merely with truth for some; and perceiving that, you obtain an insight into the distinction between sense and understanding on the one hand, and reason on the other hand; you begin to comprehend something of the constitution of your own mind, and also of mind universally.
28. I have just one more remark to make before I expand my definition of philosophy, by means of
