what more the Department could do to help.[197] Vice President Pence told Rosen that the situation at the Capitol seemed then to be "improving."[198] The head of his USSS security detail recalls overhearing the Vice President asking USCP Chief Sund, over the phone, whether it would be possible to "go back to finish the business of the government this evening."[199] At 4:42 p.m., the head of the Vice President's detail emailed the USSS Office of Protective Operations that the Vice President was confirming with Chief Sund that it would "take days to sweep and reopen" the Capitol.[200]
Congressional leadership continued to push to return to the Capitol to continue certifying the electoral votes. Senior DOJ and FBI officials—including Rosen, Bowdich, and Donoghue—held two conference calls. Donoghue remembered that the first, at 6 p.m., was a "law enforcement-level call" with General Daniel R. Hokansen, chief of the National Guard Bureau, and focused on the role of the DC National Guard.[201] The second call, at approximately 7 p.m., included Speaker Pelosi, Leader McConnell, Leader Schumer, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, and General Milley, as well as other congressional leaders.[202] During that call, FBI and other law enforcement officials on the ground provided an updated timeline for clearing the Capitol to "hopefully get in an hour later."[203]
At 8:05 p.m., the U.S. Capitol Police announced that the Capitol Building was clear and that Congress could resume counting electoral votes.[204] Shortly after Members returned, Donoghue left the Capitol.[205]
DC FEMS statistics help describe the scope of the January 6th riot at the Capitol. Over the course of the day, DC FEMS reported 22 EMS responses, 14 EMS transports, including two cardiac arrests and two critical injury transports. There were an estimated 250 injured law enforcement officers from numerous agencies.[206] One hundred-fourteen USCP officers reported injuries.[207] Five police officers who were at the Capitol on January 6th died in the days following the riot.
Federal and local law enforcement authorities were in possession of multiple streams of intelligence predicting violence directed at the Capitol prior to January 6th. Although some of that intelligence was fragmentary, it should have been sufficient to warrant far more vigorous preparations for the security of the joint session. The failure to sufficiently share and act upon that intelligence jeopardized the lives of the police officers defending the Capitol and everyone in it.
While the danger to the Capitol posed by an armed and angry crowd was foreseeable, the fact that the President of the United States would be the catalyst of their fury and facilitate the attack was unprecedented in American history. If we lacked the imagination to suppose that a President would incite an attack on his own Government, urging his supporters to "fight
