Page:Final Report of the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol.pdf/753

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APPENDIX 2
727

General Piatt viewed the "limited request"[36] as a "pretty good, tailored mission," that was "not vague."[37] General James McConville, chief of staff of the Army, called the request appropriately "restricted"[38] with "a very low military signature."[39]

According to testimony by Defense Department witnesses, after a summer of perceived overreach, military leadership was grateful for the delineated parameters set by the city itself.

The substance of the request—limited to traffic and crowd control "so they could have more police officers to do police functions"[40]—was not seen as narrow by District officials. "I would say it's a specific request," Chief of DC Police (Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD")) Robert Contee said.[41] "[L]eave the unlawful stuff, leave that to the police to deal with."[42] Mayor Bowser said: "I don't know any law enforcement person who would suggest that urban disturbances aren't best handled by the police."[43]

"Civil disturbance was not something we requested at that time. Mostly also because the vast majority of the, if not all, of the permitted protests were taking place on Federal lands," said Director of the DC Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency Christopher Rodriguez.[44] The District had no jurisdiction. "Mayor Bowser cannot make a request on behalf of the White House or on behalf of the Capitol for U.S. Capitol—for . . . DC National Guardsmen to deploy to those two entities. She can't," Chief Contee said.[45] At this time, it was well known that President Trump had planned a speech and rally on "Federal lands"—on the Ellipse south of the White House. It was not widely known that President Trump intended to "spontaneously" instruct the tens of thousands of supporters at that Ellipse rally to march down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol.[46]


Five Days of "Tremendous Resistance". At first, Secretary McCarthy was not sold on involving the Guard at all. Major General Walker called Secretary McCarthy "instantly when I got the letters" from the District on Thursday, December 31st, and "initially I felt I must have caught him at a bad time."[47] Secretary McCarthy recalls it being a short conversation. "I said, 'okay, got it. Thank you.' You want to immediately flip it so that Secretary of Defense knows that we alerted his office," he said.[48]

According to Major General Walker's account of this call, the Secretary initially stated "'We're not doing it,' "[49] and then left the door open for further discussion. Major General Walker explained: "'I said, 'Well, sir, I think you should look at it.' And then he told me, 'Well, we'll talk about it, but we don't really want to do this, because the look it would give, the military out there interfering.' . . . He says, 'Well, we'll discuss it on Monday.' "[50]