"subsequent, personal authorization," the Guard would not be issued batons, helmets, or body armor; could not interact physically with protestors, except in self-defense; and that the Quick Reaction Force (QRF)—40 servicemembers staged in case of an emergency at Joint Base Andrews in Prince George's County, Maryland—could be deployed only as a last resort.[93]
Above the tactical level, changes in the mission of the Guard had to be approved by the Secretary of the Army and, in some cases—in order to "interact physically with protestors" or be issued batons—required running further up the chain to the Secretary of Defense.[94]
To District officials, that seemed new—and unnecessary. "[The Secretary told us,] if you send them to any other kind of mission, that has to get approval from me. And I just think that those were unnecessary restrictions . . ." Chief Contee said.[95]
What the QRF would be called upon to do, even in the case of an emergency, is a matter of debate. The letter and memorandum do not expressly note whether the QRF could be used to support the original mission of the Guard—traffic and crowd control—or a new mission helping contain sudden and out-of-hand civil disturbance.[96] The DC Guard official put in charge of the QRF for January 5th and 6th, Lieutenant Colonel David Reinke, said he had not been given much guidance as to their role.[97]
The Army and the DC Guard appear to have had different understandings. "[T]he intent of the quick reaction force was really to send these troops over to help if they had a problem at one of the traffic command posts," General McConville said.[98] "There never was an intent for a quick reaction force to go to the Capitol . . . ."[99] According to Army officials, without a con-op and a formal change in mission, the QRF could do traffic control and no more.
That was not how others imagined an emergency unit would or should operate. According to Major General Walker, "a quick reaction force, something's happening; do I have time to find you and call you and ask you?"[100] He called the preapproval language "highly unusual,"[101] particularly as their name "already implied that it's a last resort,"[102] their intended purpose was if "[u]nexpectedly, you have a spontaneous unrest,"[103] and if "I need to write a concept of operations for a quick reaction force? They're no longer quick. It's just a reaction force."[104]
Capitol Police Board "Prepared" without Guard Help. It wasn't clear to everyone involved in planning for the events anticipated on January 6th that all agencies, including the Capitol Police, were deploying all their resources ahead of that day. "We had had issues understanding, getting the full picture of U.S. Capitol Police's operational posture and what their planning was," Director Rodriguez said.[105]
