system of interference pursued by the former authorities of Aden towards the inhabitants of the Somali coast. A partial intermeddling with the quarrels of these people is unwise. We have the whole line completely in our power. An armed cruiser, by a complete blockade, would compel the inhabitants to comply with any requisitions. But either our intervention should be complete,--either we should constitute ourselves sole judges of all disputes, or we should sedulously turn a deaf ear to their complaints. The former I not only understand to be deprecated by our rulers, but I also hold it to be imprudent. Nothing is more dangerous than to influence in any way the savage balance of power between these tribes: by throwing our weight on one side we may do them incalculable mischief. The Somal, like the Arab Bedouins, live in a highly artificial though an apparently artless state of political relations; and the imperfect attempt of strangers to interfere would be turned to the worst account by the designing adventurer and the turbulent spirit who expects to rise by means of anarchy and confusion. Hitherto our partial intervention between the Habr Awal of Berberah and the Habr Gerhajis of Zayla has been fraught with evils to them, and consequently to us. But it is a rapidly prevailing custom for merchants and travellers to engage an Abban or Protector, not on the African coast, as was formerly case, but at Aden. It is clearly advantageous to encourage this practice, since it gives us a right in case of fraud or violence to punish the Abban as he deserves. Lastly, we cannot expect great things without some establishment at Berberah. Were a British agent settled there, he could easily select the most influential and respectable men, to be provided with a certificate entitling them to the honor and emolument of protecting strangers. Nothing would tend more surely than this
