Cite as 360 Ark. 528 (2005)
anciently afforded by chancery in respect to an implied obligation arising by operation of law, and is grounded in equitable principle. In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Benevento, 133 N.J.L. 315, 44 A.2d 97 (1945), the court said the action of assumpsit has been extended:
To almost every case where an obligation arises from natural reasons, and the just construction oflaw, that is quasi ex contractu . . . It lies only for money, which ex aequo et bono, the defendant ought to refund . . . This action is greatly favored by the courts. It is less restricted and fettered by technical rules and formalities than any other form of action. . . . It approaches nearer to a bill in equity than any other common law action.
This concept is supported by United States v. Jefferson Elec. Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 386, 54 S. Ct. 443; Holcomb v. Kentucky Union Co., 262 Ky. 192, 90 S.W.2d 25; Beauregard v. Orleans Trust Co., 108 Vt. 42, 182 A. 182; and Allen v. Mendelsohn & Co., 207 Ala. 537, 93 So. 416. In the latter case the court said:
Assumpsit is an action of an equitable character, liberal in form, and greatly favored by the court as a remedy . . . no agreement is necessary; assumpsit will lie wherever the circumstances are such that the law, ex debito justitiae will imply a promise.
While an action of assumpsit, although based on equitable principles is an action at law, the law is well settled that when the chancery court has jurisdiction of a case for one purpose, it will retain jurisdiction to settle the rights of the parties arising out of the subject matter. Austin v. Dertnott Canning Co., 182 Ark. 1128, 34 S.W.2d 773 (1931); Spears v. Rich, 241 Ark. 15, 405 S.W.2d 929 (1966). Unquestionably, this action for injunctive and other relief was one cognizable in equity, and therefore, the court has jurisdiction to do complete justice as between the parties.
Import Motors, 268 Ark. 1052–53. In Fite v. Fite, 233 Ark. 469, 345 S.W.2d 362 (1961), this court stated:
The decisive questions for decision are whether the trial court erred in submitting the issues to the jury on the principle of unjust enrichment, and whether the facts in this case sustain an application of that principle
