ALITO, J., dissenting
subjected to the most rigid scrutiny.” Fisher I, 570 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[J]udicial review must begin from the position that ‘any official action that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently suspect.’ ” Ibid.; see also Grutter, 539 U. S., at 388 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (“ ‘Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination’ ”). Under strict scrutiny, the use of race must be “necessary to further a compelling governmental interest,” and the means employed must be “ ‘specifically and narrowly’ ” tailored to accomplish the compelling interest. Id., at 327, 333 (O’Connor, J., for the Court).
The “higher education dynamic does not change” this standard. Fisher I, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 12). “Racial discrimination [is] invidious in all contexts,” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 619 (1991), and “ ‘[t]he analysis and level of scrutiny applied to determine the validity of [a racial] classification do not vary simply because the objective appears acceptable,’ ” Fisher I, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 12).
Nor does the standard of review “ ‘depen[d] on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.’ ” Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 244, 270 (2003) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 224 (1995)); see also Miller, supra, at 904 (“This rule obtains with equal force regardless of ‘the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification’ ” (quoting Croson, supra, at 494 (plurality opinion of O’Connor, J.)). “Thus, ‘any person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest of judicial scrutiny.’ ” Gratz, supra, at 270 (quoting Adarand, supra, at 224).
