numerous sources, including security officials, ministers and former Presidents, told the Mission that the practice follows a different pattern. First, coordination among agencies is almost non-existent: the said Council is more a formality than a coordinating mechanism. Second, reporting lines follow personal and political loyalties rather than constitutional arrangements. Heads of security agencies report the substantive information to "those who appointed them, to whom they have loyalty", assigning only formalities and trivial issues to the Central Security Council. In addition, there is a severe lack of oversight and/or judicial review of the work of security agencies. For instance, the "communication interception" department in Military Intelligence has "standing authorization" to intercept whatever communication is deemed relevant by the department, with the sole endorsement of the head of the agency, without any kind of external oversight or review. Similarly, it is apparent that there is very little, if any, accountability other than that based on informal and extra-constitutional loyalties.
18. This set-up partly explains the lack of trust the Lebanese people seem to have in their security agencies. Almost without exception, all those who spoke to the Mission, including some security officials, expressed doubts about the capacity and/or the will of the security agencies to provide security to political figures under threat. While some accused the security apparatus of outright involvement in threatening politicians, others said that the dominant culture was one in which politicians were expected to protect themselves by their own means or where, at best, the security agencies did not have enough clout to protect the threatened. Many pointed to the fact that Lebanon had witnessed a great number of political assassinations over the previous 30 years and that most of them remained unsolved to date.
19. After discussions with many security officials, including the heads of Military Intelligence, the "Special Forces and Counter-terrorism" department of Military Intelligence, the communication interception department in Military Intelligence, General Security, the Internal Security Forces, and the Republican Guard, the Mission came to the conclusion that there had been a serious failure on the part of the Lebanese security apparatus to predict and prevent the assassination of Mr. Hariri. Despite widespread rumours of threats of physical harm against Mr. Hariri and/or Mr. Jumblatt, including the possibility of attempts on their lives and/or the life of members of their families, and despite the attempt on the life of former Minister Marwan Hemadeh, none of the security services had taken additional measure to protect any of them.
20. All of the security services denied having received information of a threat or a possible threat to Mr. Hariri, Mr. Jumblatt or any members of their families. However, everyone else outside the security services who talked to the Mission seemed aware of those threats. In addition, despite the acknowledged heightened tension, none of the security agencies had prepared an "assessment profile" regarding the security of Mr. Hariri, "the most important political figure in Lebanon". None of the security agencies had suggested or advised that the level of protection provided to Mr. Hariri be raised nor did they attempt this. Quite the contrary: the close protection team provided to Mr. Hariri by the Internal Security Forces was reduced from approximately 40 to 8 persons shortly after he had left office. Although this reduction was in line with the regulations, it still constituted stark negligence in respect of the special circumstances at hand. At the moment of
