Page:Fletcher v. Oliver.pdf/9

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OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS.
297

Term, 1868.]
Fletcher v. Oliver, sheriff, &c.

Under the original charter of the city, passed November 1835, by the 9th section of the act of incorporation, "the inhabitants" of the city were exempt from working on county roads. It will be observed that both these exemptions were confined to the "inhabitants," and therefore must have been of a personal natnre. In 1866 the charter of the city was amended, and the words "county road" left out, and the words "any road" were placed in lieu thereof. The road law in force at the time (1866) recognized "military roads" as a separate class of roads from "county roads;" and we are led to presume that the word "any" was placed in the amended charter, instead of the word "county," to the end that there should be no further cavil about the inhabitants being subject to work on any road outside the city, or pay commutation therefor. The law required labor from the inhabitant on the roads and highways. This labor could be commuted by paying the overseer two dollars per day. In time this demand for labor was regarded by the people as a "tax," which went to pay other laborers for performing the labor, and this is the "tax" that the Legislature designed the inhabitants of Little Rock should be exempt from paying. Having, as we think, disposed of this branch of the case, we will now proceed to examine the law of 1868, which it is alleged is unconstitutional, and in conflict with the charter of the city.

We are advised that general laws do not repeal special laws by mere implication. This fact is admitted, but we think that there is no conflict between the laws. The one provides for levying a county road tax on the taxable property of the county, the other for the exemption of the inhabitants of the city of Little Rock from performing labor, or paying any commutation therefor, on any of the roads outside Of the limits of the city.

The first constitutional objection is, that the act embraces more than one subject in the same title.

The title of the act is for "opening and regulating roads and highways." Under this title may be included every act necessary to carry into effect or accomplish the design. The