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Wilson: I am relaxed about it. Schmidt is going to talk on economics. I don't know yet exactly what he is going to say. Last year he was all excited about the collapse of the banking system and I don't know yet what his main problem is this year. As far as I am concerned, I will be saying that we never doubted your commitments and your solidarity with us. Of course, more will be done on the fringes here, on Greece, Cyprus, Portugal.
Callaghan: Should we discuss the political consequences of relations with the LDCs? I must say that at the OECD, the US proposals were well received. Of course, people had a chance this time to look at your speech beforehand.
Wilson: I have only read half of my speech so far.
It looks like the snarl-up on producer relations on the question of raw materials has eased a bit.
President: It seems so from my talk with Giscard last night.
Kissinger: We had a good response to my IEA speech.
Callaghan: These problems are as much political as economic. At the Commonwealth Conference, after shouting into the mikes people then began to talk sense. The same thing will happen at the special UN session.
Kissinger: Your initiative at the Commonwealth Conference took a lot of the sting out of the talk.
Wilson: Well, Burnham at first attacked it but he then settled down.
Callaghan: The US proposals for commissioner were well received.
President: What do you think are the prospects for CSCE?
Wilson: What do you think?
Kissinger: The Soviets are moving on Basket III. The only real sticking point is CBMs -- the question of the depth of the zone. I think we could settle on 250 kilometers. On follow-on, I had an exchange with Gromyko in Vienna. I said we supported the Danish proposal, but I said that perhaps there could be meetings after a year or 18 months, but Gromyko said no, it should be after three to four years.
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