a physical fact,[1] but on the next page he proves that “physical facts do not possess reality.” All he has said, then, is that since art is a real fact it cannot belong to a class of unreal facts—that is, that art is a thing which does in truth exist. Quod non erat demonstrandum.
But we do not turn to a philosopher to learn that art is art, and that art is a portion of reality. So much we may infer for ourselves, with our own weak powers, even without recourse to Vico or to Baumgarten. From the philosopher we seek something more. We seek, for instance, some explanation of the phenomenon of art which shall be new and constructive even though it be incomplete. We seek primarily to ascertain whether or not there exists a sure and certain standard by which we may judge the beauty and the ugliness of works of art. But Croce gives us no help. There are just two types of explanation: the type that goes from the particular to the general, and the type that starts with the whole and proceeds to the component parts. In the first case we affirm that a given object belongs to a certain class of things having certain common characteristics; in the second we analyze the thing itself, and reveal its nature by reducing it to its elements. But in the æsthetics of Croce neither one of these two types of explanation is to be found. His procedure consists al-
- ↑ P. 229.
