ities, such as postal service or the distribution of energy, of light, or of education, cannot be carried on by individuals acting independently, but demand union and coöperation; and he believes that a multiplicity of private organizations, made keen by competition and by the more immediate control of their component members, may have better success than a monopolistic State in satisfying individual needs. But with all this we are still within the realm of unionism; there is no indication here of the development of a truly individual point of view.
Nor can it be said that Spencer is trying to substitute voluntary for compulsory coöperation, and that individual liberty is thus safeguarded, since we can turn from one society to another when the first no longer satisfies us. For since certain services are necessary for all, one must accept a society perforce just as one becomes part of a nation perforce; and since the enterprises in question are necessarily on a large scale, the societies cannot be numerous, and one's choice is therefore limited. Furthermore, they may unite as trusts for their own advantage, and to the disadvantage of the consumer. They may be as tyrannical as the State. And if it be said that one may go from one society to another, cannot the same be said with regard to States? A man who is unwilling to accept the laws of one State may go to another and assume another
