Breyer, J., dissenting
sovereign immunity in their courts. And they might have stopped there, ignoring the fact that, under international law, a nation had the sovereign power to change its mind.
But there is simply nothing in the Constitution or its history to suggest that anyone reasoned in that way. No constitutional language supports that view. Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Story, and the Court itself took a somewhat contrary view without mentioning the matter. And there is no strong reason for treating States differently than foreign nations in this context. Why would the Framers, silently and without any evident reason, have transformed sovereign immunity from a permissive immunity predicated on comity and consent into an absolute immunity that States must accord one another? The Court in Hall could identify no such reason. Nor can I.
III
In any event, stare decisis requires us to follow Hall, not overrule it. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833, 854–855 (1992); see also Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2015) (slip op., at 7–8). Overruling a case always requires “‘special justification.’” Kimble, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). What could that justification be in this case? The majority does not find one.
The majority believes that Hall was wrongly decided. But “an argument that we got something wrong—even a good argument to that effect—cannot by itself justify scrapping settled precedent.” Kimble, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8). Three dissenters in Hall also believed that Hall was wrong, but they recognized that the Court’s opinion was “plausible.” 440 U. S., at 427 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). While reasonable jurists might disagree about whether Hall was correct, that very fact—that Hall is not obviously wrong—shows that today’s majority is obviously wrong to overrule it.
