Breyer, J., dissenting
tions.” 440 U. S., at 443 (opinion of Rehnquist, J.). But I can find nothing in the intervening 40 years to suggest that this fear was well founded. The Board and its amici have, by my count, identified only 14 cases in 40 years in which one State has entertained a private citizen’s suit against another State in its courts. See Brief for Petitioner 46–47; Brief for State of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae 13–14. In at least one of those 14 cases, moreover, the state court eventually agreed to dismiss the suit against its sister State as a matter of comity. See Montaño v. Frezza, 2017–NMSC–015, 393 P. 3d 700, 710. How can it be that these cases, decided over a period of four decades, show Hall to be unworkable?
The Hall issue so rarely arises because most States, like most sovereign nations, are reluctant to deny a sister State the immunity that they would prefer to enjoy reciprocally. Thus, even in the absence of constitutionally mandated immunity, States normally grant sovereign immunity voluntarily. States that fear that this practice will be insufficiently protective are free to enter into an interstate compact to guarantee that the normal practice of granting immunity will continue. See Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U. S. 433, 440 (1981).
Although many States have filed an amicus brief in this case asking us to overturn Hall, I can find nothing in the brief that indicates that reaffirming Hall would affront “the dignity and respect due sovereign entities.” Federal Maritime Comm’n, 535 U. S., at 769. As already explained, sovereign interests fall on both sides of this question. While reaffirming Hall might harm States seeking sovereign immunity, overruling Hall would harm States seeking to control their own courts.
Perhaps the majority believes that there has been insufficient reliance on Hall to justify preserving it. But any such belief would ignore an important feature of reliance. The people of this Nation rely upon stability in the law.
