Thomas, J., dissenting
The Court correctly notes that it is not uncommon for the same conduct to be a primary violation with respect to one offense and aiding and abetting with respect to another—as, for example, when someone illegally sells a gun to help another person rob a bank. Ante, at 11. But this case does not involve two distinct crimes. The majority has interpreted certain provisions of an offense so broadly as to render superfluous the more stringent, on-point requirements of a narrower provision of the same offense. Criminal laws regularly and permissibly overlap with each other in a way that allows the same conduct to constitute different crimes with different punishments. That differs significantly from interpreting provisions in a law to completely eliminate specific limitations in a neighboring provision of that very same law. The majority’s overreading of Rules 10b–5(a) and (c) and §17(a)(1) is especially problematic because the heartland of these provisions is conduct-based fraud—“employ[ing] [a] device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” or “engag[ing] in any act, practice, or course of business”—not mere misstatements. 15 U. S. C. §77q(a)(1); 17 CFR §§240.10b–5(a), (c).
The Court attempts to cabin the implications of its holding by highlighting several facts that supposedly would distinguish this case from a case involving a secretary or other person “tangentially involved in disseminat[ing]” fraudulent misstatements. Ante, at 7. None of these distinctions withstands scrutiny. The fact that Lorenzo “sent false statements directly to investors” in e-mails that “invited [investors] to follow up with questions,” ibid., puts him in precisely the same position as a secretary asked to send an identical message from her e-mail account. And under the unduly capacious interpretation that the majority gives to the securities laws, I do not see why it would matter whether the sender is the “vice president of an investment banking company” or a secretary, ibid.—if the sender knowingly sent false statements,