Page:Frontinus - The stratagems, and, the aqueducts of Rome (Bennet et al 1925).djvu/69

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
Stratagems, I. ii. 8–iii. 4

In like manner, Tisamenus, the son of Orestes, hearing that a ridge, a natural stronghold, was held by the enemy, sent men ahead to ascertain the facts; and upon their reporting that his impression was without foundation, he began his march. But when he saw a large number of birds all at once fly from the suspected ridge and not settle down at all, he came to the conclusion that the enemy's troops were hiding there; and so, leading his army by a detour, he escaped those lying in wait for him.[1]

Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal, knew that the armies of Livius and Nero had united (although by avoiding two separate camps they strove to conceal this fact), because he observed horses rather lean from travel and men somewhat sunburned, as naturally results from marching.[2]

III. On Determining the Character of the War

Whenever Alexander of Macedon had a strong army, he chose the sort of warfare in which he could fight in open battle.

Gaius Caesar, in the Civil War, having an army of veterans and knowing that the enemy had only raw recruits, always strove to fight in open battle.

Fabius Maximus, when engaged in war with Hannibal, who was inflated by his success in battle, decided to avoid any dangerous hazards and to devote himself solely to the protection of Italy. By this policy he earned the name of Cunctator ("The Delayer") and the reputation of a consummate general.[3]

The Byzantines in their war with Philip, avoid-

  1. Cf. Polyaen. ii. xxxvii.
  2. 207 B.C. Cf. I. i. 9 and Livy xxvii. 47.
  3. 217 B.C. Cf. Livy xxii. xii. 6-12.
23