[Gagarin]’. It made clear, however, that the ‘respect and consideration’ devoted to the cosmonaut was related to his roles as a ‘military pilot and scientist’. The release concluded by stating that his feat would be ‘forever etched in the history of mankind’ and that his name would be in a ‘place of honour at the obelisk of modern world heroes’[1].
The perception that an important part of Brazilians was impressed by the USSR’s scientific achievements was shared by the political advisor of the U.S. Embassy in Brasilia. In January 1962, following the resumption of diplomatic relations between Brazil and the USSR in November – already with João Goulart as president – this diplomat stressed that the scientific achievements of the USSR “deeply impressed Brazilian youth” and that even the most conservative Brazilians were also impressed by some economic records of the socialist superpower. In a message to the State Department, he suggested “more and better dramatization” of the U.S. technical-scientific and military achievements and the beginning of “impact projects in key areas such as the Northeast,” so as to nurture “hopes [...] for democratic (i.e., U.S.) solutions.”[2].
Brazilians’ interest in Soviet modernization would be evident during the Soviet Industrial Exhibition held in Rio de Janeiro in May 1962. Khrushchev sent a message on the occasion of the inauguration.[3] The event was the largest of its kind that the socialist superpower held throughout the year (Blasier 1989). More than 500,000 people attended the fair where models of Sputnik-1, Vostok-1 and Vostok-2 capsules were shown (Rupprecht 2011). Governor Lacerda welcomed the Soviets mentioning the ‘extraordinary demonstrations of scientific and technical capacity’ that deserved ‘all the respect’ of Brazilians[4] (Lacerda 1963).
This did not mean, however, that most Brazilians liked or even had a positive view of the USSR. Using survey results from the United States Information Agency (USIA) in Brazil, Loureiro et al. (2015) assert that only 12% of all respondents had a positive impression of the USSR in 1962. Interestingly, the figure remained at 12 percent the following year, according to a survey conducted by the New York Times (Rupprecht 2011). This persistence initially suggests that the role played by the USSR in the Cuban Missile Crisis had no major impact on Brazilian public opinion.
However, it is clear from the USIA survey that the rejection of Fidel Castro was substantially higher than of the USSR in 1962 (approximately 70% against 55%) (Loureiro et al. 2015). The governments of Cuba and the USSR had different approaches on how to support the spread of socialism throughout the globe. Since the late 1950s, the Soviet Union had advocated the adoption of a broad leftwing front in peripheral countries to gain power in democratic fashion, while Cuba and China supported revolution. This Soviet guideline somehow indirectly brought
- ↑ “Explicações sobre a medalha a Gagarin” (1961, 6).
- ↑ NARA, RG 59, CDF (1960-63), 632.61/1-1562, box 1328, Despatch 566, Brasília-State, Confidential, “Brazilian Attitudes Toward Soviet Union and their Influence on U.S.-Brazil Relations”, Brasília, 15 January 1962, p. 2-4.
- ↑ “Saudação de Kruchev aos visitantes da exposição soviética” (1962, 5).
- ↑ For more on the Soviet Industrial Exhibition in Rio de Janeiro see Caterina (2019 , 245-46).
