Page:Gametronics Proceedings.djvu/163

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.

Baer assigned Harrison and Rusch to an enclosed 10 x 15 ft. office containing two desks, a workbench and support electronic equipment. The door was kept locked at all times; only Baer, Harrison and Rusch had keys.

The project was a closely guarded secret, although the area was referred to as "The Game Room." Because Harrison and Rusch had a habit of playing recorded guitar music while working, most fellow employees assumed that the room was being used to develop an electronic guitar.

"We had bought an RCA 17-inch color TV console set in 1967," says Baer, "and, believe it or not, here we were fully ten years ago, playing chase games, target games, and, a little later on, the first fully interactive ping-pong and hockey games with color and FM sound through the TV set. Even our earliest ping-pong games were played against a green background, while, naturally, hockey was played against a background of blue ice."

A working multi-game model was completed in mid-1967 and Sanders Associates began looking for licensees. Demonstrations for potential customers continued through 1969 when, after a deal with RCA fell through at the last minute, an agreement with Magnavox was arranged.

Magnavox demonstrated the Sanders-developed game in May, 1972, and had established substantial production line capability by the summer of 1972. Nearly 100,000 Odyssey games were sold that year.

The first Odyssey game, introduced in 1972 by Magnavox, contained approximately 305 discrete parts in its master control unit and hand controls. Overlays for placing on the television set screens were supplied with Odyssey to simulate field backgrounds. The Odyssey package also included dice, poker chips, play money, card decks and game boards. Twelve games, many very similar, were offered.

Acceptance was gradual. Some of the reasons that have been advanced for Odyssey's failure to skyrocket in sales more than it did after its introduction include too many auxiliary components, inadequate promotion, and belief that it could only be used with a Magnavox television set.

Magnavox was also beset with other problems during the period following the introduction of Odyssey. It had delayed in converting its television line to solid-state devices when competitors began moving in this direction. In its rush to catch up, it experienced serious conversion problems and its reputation suffered badly. Its consumer electronics operation, which had recorded a $22 million profit in 1972, dropped to a $5.8 million loss in 1973, and then plunged to a $42.1 million loss in 1974. It remained in the red in 1975 with a $10.3

–161–