principles, would be quite willing to take France on the ground that it was named after the Franks.
To-day, however, the Teutons are content with something less than this full logic of Teutonism; and this alone marks a difference between the two cases. Even intrinsically, this argument could be answered by adducing the Pacifist or Prussian proposals about Poland; for if Prussia not only retains Posen but completes her task of turning the other Polish fragments into a fictitious state under her own protection, she will have added something to her power as much more important than Alsace-Lorraine as the annexation of the United States would be more important than the annexation of one of the smallest South American republics. Nevertheless, it will be well to concentrate here on the case of Alsace-Lorraine, and to leave the case of Poland for consideration in another context. In one very real sense, the example of the lost French provinces really is the mark and test of this war, in comparison with the other aggressive wars of Prussia; and it is certain that public opinion everywhere will regard the fate of these provinces as the register of Prussian victory or defeat.
The writer of these lines is an Englishman; but he is Anti-Prussian primarily because he is a European. He also happens, however, to be vividly convinced of, and vitally concerned for, certain ideals not always associated with Anti-Prussianism; ideals by no means common to all Europeans and, if anything, rather uncommon among Englishmen. The two most directly concerned here are the dogma of democracy and, what is perhaps a negative de-
