Page:Gilberto Garza, Jr. v. Idaho.pdf/18

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Cite as: 586 U. S. ___ (2019)
1

Thomas, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


No. 17–1026


GILBERTO GARZA, JR., PETITIONER v. IDAHO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO
[February 27, 2019]

Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Gorsuch joins, and with whom Justice Alito joins as to Parts I and II, dissenting.

Petitioner Gilberto Garza avoided a potential life sentence by negotiating with the State of Idaho for reduced charges and a 10-year sentence. In exchange, Garza waived several constitutional and statutory rights, including “his right to appeal.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 44a, 49a. Despite this express waiver, Garza asked his attorney to challenge on appeal the very sentence for which he had bargained. Garza’s counsel quite reasonably declined to file an appeal for that purpose, recognizing that his client had waived this right and that filing an appeal would potentially jeopardize his plea bargain. Yet, the majority finds Garza’s counsel constitutionally ineffective, holding that an attorney’s performance is per se deficient and per se prejudicial any time the attorney declines a criminal defendant’s request to appeal an issue that the defendant has waived. In effect, this results in a “defendant-always-wins” rule that has no basis in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S. 470 (2000), or our other ineffective-assistance precedents, and certainly no basis in the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment. I respectfully dissent.

I

In 2015, in accordance with two plea agreements, Garza